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Evolutionary Game Theory and the Modeling of Economic Behavior

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Abstract

Since the 1950s economists have applied game-theoretical concepts to a wide variety of economic problems. The Nash equilibrium concept has proven to be a powerful instrument in analyzing the outcome of economic processes. Since the late 1980s economists have also shown a growing interest in the application of evolutionary game theory. This paper discusses the main concepts of evolutionary game theory and their applicability to economic issues. Whereas traditional game theory focusses on the static Nash equilibria as the possible outcomes of the game, evolutionary game theory teaches us to explicitly model the behavior of individuals outside equilibrium. This may provide us with a better understanding of the dynamic forces within a society of interacting individuals.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, Free University, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081, HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Gerard Van der Laan & Xander Tieman

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  1. Gerard Van der Laan
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  2. Xander Tieman
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Van der Laan, G., Tieman, X. Evolutionary Game Theory and the Modeling of Economic Behavior. De Economist 146, 59–89 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1003253925406

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