, Volume 142, Issue 1, pp 61–79 | Cite as


  • L. Floridi


The tripartite account of propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p as justified true belief can become adequate only if it can solve the Gettier Problem. However, the latter can be solved only if the problem of a successful coordination of the resources (at least truth and justification) necessary and sufficient to deliver propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p can be solved. In this paper, the coordination problem is proved to be insolvable by showing that it is equivalent to the ''coordinated attack'' problem, which is demonstrably insolvable in epistemic logic. It follows that the tripartite account is not merely inadequate as it stands, as proved by Gettier-type counterexamples, but demonstrably irreparable in principle, so that efforts to improve it can never succeed.


True Belief Coordination Problem Epistemic Logic Justify True Belief GETTIER Problem 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. Alston, W.: 1986, 'Epistemic Circularity', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47, 1–30.Google Scholar
  2. Apel, K. O.: 1975, 'The Problem of Philosophical Fundamental-Grounding in Light of a Transcendental Pragmatic of Language', Man & World 8, 239–275.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Chisholm, R. M.: 1989, Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.Google Scholar
  4. Crisp, T. M.: 2000, 'Gettier and Plantinga's Revised Account of Warrant', Analysis 60(265), 42–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Dancy, J.: 1985, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, Blackwell, Oxford.Google Scholar
  6. Dancy, J. and E. Sosa (eds): 1992, A Companion to Epistemology, Blackwell Reference, Oxford.Google Scholar
  7. Everitt, N. and A. Fisher: 1995, Modern Epistemology: A New Introduction, McGraw-Hill, New York, London.Google Scholar
  8. Fagin, R., J. Y. Halpern, Y. Moses, and M. Y. Vardi: 1995, Reasoning About Knowledge, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, London.Google Scholar
  9. Floridi, L.: 1996, Scepticism and the Foundation of Epistemology: A Study in the Metalogical Fallacies, Brill, Leiden.Google Scholar
  10. Gettier, E.: 1963, 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?', Analysis 23, 121–123.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Goldman, A.: 1967, 'A Causal Theory of Knowing', Journal of Philosophy 64(12), 355–372.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Gray, J. N.: 1978, 'Notes on Database Operating Systems', in R. Bayer, R. Graham, and G. Seegmuller (eds), Operating Systems: An Advanced Course, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp. 393–481.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Greco, J. and E. Sosa (eds): 1999, The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.Google Scholar
  14. Griffiths, A. P. (ed.): 1967, Knowledge and Belief, Oxford University Press, London.Google Scholar
  15. Halpern, J. and B. Tuttle: 1993, 'Knowledge, Probability and Adversaries', Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery 40, 917–962.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Halpern, J. Y.: 1995, 'Reasoning About Knowledge: A Survey', in D. Gabbay, C. J. Hogger, and J. A. Robinson (eds), Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligenceand Logic Programming, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 1–34. A version of the paper similar to the published version is available in postscript and pdf from Scholar
  17. Halpern, J. Y. and Y. Moses: 1990, 'Knowledge and Common Knowledge in a Distributed Environment', Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery 37(3), 549–587.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Hetherington, S. C.: 1996, Knowledge Puzzles: An Introduction to Epistemology, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, Oxford.Google Scholar
  19. Kirkham, R. L. 1984, 'Does the Gettier Problem Rest on a Mistake?', Mind 93, 501–513.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Lenzen, W.: 1978, Recent Work in Epistemic Logic, North-Holland, Amsterdam.Google Scholar
  21. Morris, S. and H. S. Shin: 1997, 'Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory', Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6, 171–190.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Nozick, R: 1981, Philosophical Explanation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
  23. Pappas, G. S. (ed.): 1979, Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology, Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland; Boston.Google Scholar
  24. Pappas, G. S. and M. Swain (ed.): 1978, Essays on Knowledge and Justification, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, London.Google Scholar
  25. Pease, M., R. Shostak, and L. Lamport: 1980, 'Reaching Agreement in the Presence of Faults', Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery 27(2), 228–234.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Plantinga, A.: 1993a, Warrant: The Current Debate, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Plantinga, A.: 1993b, Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford University Press, Oxford.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Pust, J.: 2000, 'Warrant and Analysis', Analysis 60 (265), 51–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Roth, M. D. and L. Galis (ed.): 1970, Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge, Random House, New York.Google Scholar
  30. Schreiber, D. S. G.: 1987, 'The Illegitimacy of Gettier Examples', Metaphilosophy 18, 49–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Shope, R. K.: 1983, The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research, Princeton University Press, Princeton.Google Scholar
  32. Steup, M.: 1996, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, Prenctice Hall, Upper Saddle River.Google Scholar
  33. Steup, M.: 2001, 'The Analysis of Knowledge', Stanford Encyclopedia of Knowledge, Scholar
  34. Wooldridge, M. J.: 2002, An Introduction to Multiagent Systems, J. Wiley, Chichester.Google Scholar
  35. Zagzebski, L.: 1994, 'The Inescapability of Gettier Problems', Philosophical Quarterly 44(174), 65–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • L. Floridi
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of PhilosophyOxford University Wolfson CollegeOxfordUK

Personalised recommendations