, Volume 139, Issue 3, pp 405–420 | Cite as

Beauty and the Bets

  • Christopher Hitchcock


In the Sleeping Beauty problem, Beauty is uncertain whether the outcome of a certain coin toss was heads or tails. One argument suggests that her degree of belief in heads should be 1/3, while a second suggests that it should be 1/2. Prima facie, the argument for 1/2 appears to be stronger. I offer a diachronic Dutch Book argument in favor of 1/3. Even for those who are not routinely persuaded by diachronic Dutch Book arguments, this one has some important morals.


Important Moral Dutch Book Dutch Book Argument Sleep Beauty Problem Diachronic Dutch Book 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christopher Hitchcock
    • 1
  1. 1.Division of Humanities and Social Sciences 101-40California Institute of TechnologyPasadenaUSA

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