, Volume 138, Issue 1, pp 1–48 | Cite as

New foundations for epistemic change*

  • Anthony S. Gillies


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Anthony S. Gillies
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of Texas at AustinAustinU.S.A.

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