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Robust Institutions: The Logic of Levy?

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Abstract

Levy (2002) argues that J. M. Buchanan's worst-case philosophy of constitutional political economy and J. W. Tukey's worst-case philosophy of mathematical statistics are analogous. Levy's analogy, however, is problematic. Institutions are only contingently robust. Worst-case political economy is simply best-case thinking in another guise.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, PA, 17604, USA

    Andrew Farrant

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  1. Andrew Farrant
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Farrant, A. Robust Institutions: The Logic of Levy?. The Review of Austrian Economics 17, 447–451 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:RAEC.0000044640.53341.1d

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:RAEC.0000044640.53341.1d

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