Public Choice

, Volume 119, Issue 1–2, pp 91–117

Modeling Other-Regarding Preferences and an Experimental Test

  • Norman Frohlich
  • Joe Oppenheimer
  • Anja Kurki
Article

Abstract

Behavior inconsistent with self-interest has beenobserved in many contexts. We argue thatmodels designed to cope with theseanomalies are inadequate to deal with avariety of social values. Our extension ofthe Fehr & Schmidt `inequity aversion'model is applied to results from dictatorexperiments in which the money to bedivided is generated by the efforts ofpaired individuals in either one or tworooms. This production leads to sharingbehavior qualitatively different from thatfound in other dictator experiments. Thepattern of sharing can be explained byentitlements, equity, and the credibilityof the experiment.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Bazerman, M.H., Loewenstein, G.F. and White, S.B. (1992). Reversals of preference in allocation decisions: Judging an alternative versus choosing among alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly 37: 220–240.Google Scholar
  2. Bolton, G.E. (1991). A comparative model of bargaining: Theory and evidence. American Economic Review 81: 1096–1136.Google Scholar
  3. Bolton, G.E. and Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. American Economic Review 90: 166–193.Google Scholar
  4. Cain, M. (1998). An experimental investigation of motives and information in the prisoners' dilemma game advances in group processes, V 15: 133–160. In Skvoretz, J. and Szmatka, J. (Eds.). New York: JAI Press.Google Scholar
  5. Charness, G. and Rabin, M. (2000). Some Simple tests of social preferences. Working Paper.Google Scholar
  6. Cox, J.C., Sadiraj, K and Sadiraj, V. (2001). A theory of competition and fairness without inequity aversion. Paper presented at the International meetings of the Economics Society of America, Barcelona, Spain, June.Google Scholar
  7. Dawes, R.M. and Thaler, R.H. (1988). Anomalies: Cooperation. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2: 187–197.Google Scholar
  8. Eckel, C.C. and Grossman, P. (1996). The relative price of fairness: Gender differences in a punishment game. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 30: 143–158.Google Scholar
  9. Eckel, C.C. and Grossman, P. (1996). Altruism in anonymous dictator games. Games and Economic Behavior 16: 181–191.Google Scholar
  10. Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K.M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 817–868.Google Scholar
  11. Frohlich, N. (1974). Self-interest or altruism: What difference?. Journal of Conflict Resolution 18: 55–73.Google Scholar
  12. Frohlich, N. and Oppenheimer, J.A. with Bond, P. and Boschmann, I. (1984). Beyond economic man: Altruism, egalitarianism, and difference maximizing. Journal of Conflict Resolution 28: 3–24.Google Scholar
  13. Frohlich, N. and Oppenheimer, J.A. (1992). Choosing justice: An experimental approach to ethical theory. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  14. Frohlich, N. Oppenheimer, J.A., Saijo, T. and Turnbull, S. (1997). Are Japanese more 'group oriented'?: Cross-cultural comparisons of experimental results. Presented at Public Choice meetings, San Francisco, March 1997.Google Scholar
  15. Frohlich, N. and Oppenheimer, J. (2001) Choosing from a moral point of view. Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 12: 89–115.Google Scholar
  16. Frohlich, N. Oppenheimer, J.A. and Moore, B. (2001). Some doubts about measuring self-interest using dictator experiments: The costs of anonymity. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 46: 271–290.Google Scholar
  17. Hoffman, E., McCabe, K. and Smith, V. (1996). Social distance and other regarding behavior in dictator games. American Economic Review 86: 653–660.Google Scholar
  18. Konow, J. (2000). Fair shares and cognitive dissonance in allocation decisions. American Economic Review 90: 1072–1091.Google Scholar
  19. Ledyard, J.O. (1995). Public goods: A survey of experimental research. In Kagel, J.H. and Roth, A.E. (Eds.), The handbook of experimental economics, 111–194. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  20. Palmer, S. (2000). Vision science: Photons to phenomenology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  21. Preston, L.E. (1961) Utility interactions in a two-person world. Journal of Conflict Resolution 5: 354–365.Google Scholar
  22. Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review 83: 1281–1302.Google Scholar
  23. Roth, A.E. (1995). Bargaining experiments. In Kagel, J.H. and Roth, A.E. (Eds.), The handbook of experimental economics, 253–342. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  24. Ruffle, B.J. (1998). More is better, but fair is fair: Tipping in dictator and ultimatum games. Games and Economic Behavior 23: 247–265.Google Scholar
  25. Sen, A.K. (1977). Rational fools: A critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory. Philosophy and Public Affairs 6: 317–344. Reprinted in Mansbridge, J.J. (Ed.), Beyond self-interest, 25–43. Chicago: University Press.Google Scholar
  26. Valavanis, S. (1958). The resolution of conflict when utilities interact. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 2: 156–169.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Norman Frohlich
    • 1
  • Joe Oppenheimer
    • 2
  • Anja Kurki
    • 3
  1. 1.I.H Asper School of BusinessUniversity of ManitobaWinnipegCanada
  2. 2.Department of Government & PoliticsUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkU.S.A.
  3. 3.Department of Government & PoliticsUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkU.S.A.

Personalised recommendations