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Public Choice

, Volume 118, Issue 3–4, pp 437–449 | Cite as

Majority Support for Progressive Income Taxation with Corner Preferences

  • Philippe De Donder
  • Jean Hindriks
Article

Abstract

This paper studies voting over quadratic taxation when incomeis fixed and taxation non distortionary. The set of feasibletaxes is compact and self-interested voters have cornerpreferences. We first show that, if a majority winning taxpolicy exists, it involves maximum progressivity. We then givea necessary and sufficient condition on the incomedistribution for a majority winner to exist. This conditionappears to be satisfied for a large class of distributionfunctions.

Keywords

Large Class Public Finance Income Taxation Paper Study Majority Support 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Philippe De Donder
    • 1
  • Jean Hindriks
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Université de Toulouse (IDEI and GREMAQ), Manufacture des TabacsToulouseFrance
  2. 2.COREUniversité Catholique de LouvainLouvain-la-NeuveBelgium
  3. 3.Queen Mary University of LondonBelgium

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