Philosophical Studies

, Volume 118, Issue 3, pp 339–371 | Cite as

Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem

  • Karen Bennett


A lot of people believe that distinct objectscan occupy precisely the same place for theentire time during which they exist. Suchpeople have to provide an answer to the`grounding problem' – they have to explain howsuch things, alike in so many ways, nonethelessmanage to fall under different sortals, or havedifferent modal properties. I argue in detailthat they cannot say that there is anything invirtue of which spatio-temporally coincidentthings have those properties. However, I alsoargue that this may not be as bad as it looks,and that there is a way to make sense of theclaim that such properties are primitive.


Modal Property Grounding Problem 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Karen Bennett
    • 1
  1. 1.Princeton UniversityUSA and Australian National University E-mail

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