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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 118, Issue 1–2, pp 299–322 | Cite as

Assertion Revisited: On the Interpretation of Two-Dimensional Modal Semantics

  • Robert C. Stalnaker
Article

Abstract

This paper concerns the applications of two-dimensional modal semantics to the explanation of the contents of speech and thought. Different interpretations and applications of the apparatus are contrasted. First, it is argued that David Kaplan's two-dimensional semantics for indexical expressions is different from the use that I made of a formally similar framework to represent the role of contingent information in the determination of what is said. But the two applications are complementary rather than conflicting. Second, my interpretation of the apparatus is contrasted with that of David Chalmers, Frank Jackson, and David Lewis. It is argued that this difference reflects a contrast between internalist and externa list approaches to the problem of intentionality.

Keywords

Contingent Information Indexical Expression Similar Framework Modal Semantic Externa List 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert C. Stalnaker
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Linguistics and PhilosophyMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA

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