Philosophical Studies

, Volume 116, Issue 3, pp 215–269

Defending a Possible-Worlds Account of Indicative Conditionals

  • Daniel Nolan

DOI: 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000007243.60727.d4

Cite this article as:
Nolan, D. Philosophical Studies (2003) 116: 215. doi:10.1023/B:PHIL.0000007243.60727.d4


One very popular kind of semantics for subjunctive conditionals is aclosest-worlds account along the lines of theories given by David Lewisand Robert Stalnaker. If we could give the same sort of semantics forindicative conditionals, we would have a more unified account of themeaning of ``if ... then ...'' statements, one with manyadvantages for explaining the behaviour of conditional sentences. Such atreatment of indicative conditionals, however, has faced a battery ofobjections. This paper outlines a closest-worlds account of indicativeconditionals that does better than some of its cousins in explaining thebehaviour of such conditionals. The paper then discusses objectionsoffered by Dorothy Edgington and Frank Jackson to closest-worldsaccounts of indicative conditionals, and shows that these objections canbe met by the account outlined.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel Nolan
    • 1
  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentSyracuse UniversitySyracuseUSA, E-mail

Personalised recommendations