Philosophical Studies

, Volume 116, Issue 3, pp 271–307 | Cite as

Is Intentionality Dependent upon Consciousness?

  • Uriah Kriegel
Article

Abstract

It is often assumed thatconsciousness and intentionality are twomutually independent aspects of mental life.When the assumption is denounced, it usuallygives way to the claim that consciousness issomehow dependent upon intentionality. Thepossibility that intentionality may bedependent upon consciousness is rarelyentertained. Recently, however, John Searle andColin McGinn have argued for just suchdependence. In this paper, I reconstruct andevaluate their argumentation. I am in sympathyboth with their view and with the lines ofargument they employ in its defense. UnlikeSearle and McGinn, however, I am quite attachedto a naturalist approach to intentionality. Itwill turn out to be somewhat difficult toreconcile naturalism with the notion thatintentionality is dependent upon consciousness,although, perhaps surprisingly, I will arguethat McGinn's case for such dependence iscompatible with naturalism.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

REFERENCES

  1. Aquila, R. (1990): ‘Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts: Two Objections’, American Philosophical Quarterly 27, 81–87.Google Scholar
  2. Armstrong, D.M. (1968): A Materialist Theory of the Mind, New York: Humanities Press.Google Scholar
  3. Block, N.J. (1995):‘On a Confusion About the Function of Consciousness’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18, 227–247.Google Scholar
  4. Brentano, F. (1874 [1973]): Psychology from Empirical Standpoint, O. Kraus (ed.), L.L. McAlister (ed. of English edition), A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell and L.L. McAlister (trans.), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
  5. Brough, J.B. (1972):‘The Emergence of an Absolute Consciousness in Husserl's EarlyWritings on Time-Consciousness’, Man and World 5, 298–326.Google Scholar
  6. Byrne, D. (1997):‘Some Like It HOT: Consciousness and Higher Order Thoughts’, Philosophical Studies 86, 103–129.Google Scholar
  7. Byrne, A. (2001):‘Intentionalism Defended’, Philosophical Review 110, 199–240.Google Scholar
  8. Carruthers, P. (1996): Language, Thought, and Consciousness, Cambridge: Cambridge UP.Google Scholar
  9. Carruthers, P. (2000): Phenomenal Consciousness, Cambridge: Cambridge UP.Google Scholar
  10. Chisholm, R. (1957): Perceiving, Ithaca NY: Cornell UP.Google Scholar
  11. Cummins, R. (1979):‘Intention, Meaning, and Truth Conditions’, Philosophical Studies 35, 345–360.Google Scholar
  12. Dennett, D.C. (1987): The Intentional Stance, Cambridge MA: MIT Press/ Bradford Books.Google Scholar
  13. Dennett, D.C. (1991): Consciousness Explained, Cambridge MA: MIT Press/ Bradford Books.Google Scholar
  14. Dretske, F.I. (1981): Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  15. Dretske, F.I. (1988): Explaining Behavior, Cambridge MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.Google Scholar
  16. Dretske, F.I. (1993):‘Conscious Experience’, Mind 102, 263–283.Google Scholar
  17. Dretske, F.I. (1995): Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.Google Scholar
  18. Fodor, J.A. (1990):‘A Theory of Content II’, in his A Theory of Content and Other Essasys, Cambridge MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.Google Scholar
  19. Fodor, J.A. and Lepore, E. (1994):‘What Is the Connection Principle?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 837–845.Google Scholar
  20. Frank, M. (1995):‘Mental Familiarity and Epistemic Self-Ascription’, Common Knowledge 4, 30–50.Google Scholar
  21. Gennaro, R.J. (1996): Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, Philadelphia/ Amsterdam: John Benjamin Publishing Co.Google Scholar
  22. Goldman, A. (1970): A Theory of Human Action, Princeton NJ: Princeton UP.Google Scholar
  23. Goldman, A. (1993):‘Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science’, Consciousness and Cognition 2, 364–383.Google Scholar
  24. Gurwitsch, A. (1985): Marginal Consciousness, Athens OH: Ohio UP.Google Scholar
  25. Harman, G. (1990):‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, Philosophical Perspectives 4, 31–52.Google Scholar
  26. Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. (2002):‘The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality’, in D.J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford and New York: Oxford UP.Google Scholar
  27. Husserl, E. (1928 [1964]): Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, M. Heidegger (ed.), J.S. Churchill (trans.), Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press.Google Scholar
  28. Kirk, R. (1994): Raw Feeling, Oxford: Oxford UP.Google Scholar
  29. Kriegel, U. (2002a):‘Consciousness, Permanent Self-Awareness, and Higher-Order Monitoring’, Dialogue 41, 517–540.Google Scholar
  30. Kriegel, U. (2002b):‘Phenomenal Content’, Erkenntnis 57, 175–198.Google Scholar
  31. Kriegel, U. (2003):‘Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, 103–132.Google Scholar
  32. Levine, J. (2001): Purple Haze, Oxford: Oxford UP.Google Scholar
  33. Loar, B. (2002):‘Phenomenal Intentionality As the Basis for Mental Content’, in D.J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford and New York: Oxford UP.Google Scholar
  34. Lurz, R. (2001):‘Begging the Question: A Reply to Lycan’, Analysis 61, 313–318.Google Scholar
  35. Lycan, W.G. (1990):‘Consciousness as Internal Monitoring’, Philosophical Perspectives9, 1–14.Google Scholar
  36. Lycan, W. (1996): Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.Google Scholar
  37. Lycan, W.G. (2001):‘A Simple Argument for a Higher-Order Representation Theory of Consciousness’, Analysis 61, 3–4.Google Scholar
  38. McGinn, C. (1988/1997):‘Consciousness and Content’, Proceedings of the British Academy 76, 219–239 [reprinted in N.J. Block, Flanagan, O. and Güzeldere, G. (eds.) (1997): The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books].Google Scholar
  39. McGinn, C. (1989):‘Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?’, Mind 98, 349–366.Google Scholar
  40. McGinn, C. (1999): The Mysterious Flame, New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
  41. Millikan, R.G. (1984): Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge MAS: MIT Press/Bradford Books.Google Scholar
  42. Moran, R. (2001): Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge, Princeton NJ: Princeton UP.Google Scholar
  43. Natsoulas, T. (1993):‘What Is Wrong with Appendage Theory of Consciousness?’, Philosophical Psychology 6, 137–154.Google Scholar
  44. Natsoulas, T. (1996):‘The Case for Intrinsic Theory: I. An Introduction’, Journal of Mind and Behavior 17, 267–286.Google Scholar
  45. Quine, W.V.O. (1960): Word and Object, Cambridge MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.Google Scholar
  46. Rey, G. (1988):‘A Question about Consciousness’, in H. Otto and J. Tueidio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind, Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
  47. Rosenthal, D.M. (1986):‘Two Concept of Consciousness’, Philosophical Studies 94, 329–359.Google Scholar
  48. Rosenthal, D.M. (1990):‘A Theory of Consciousness’, ZiF Technical Report 40, Bielfield, Germany [reprinted in N.J., Block, Flanagan, O. and Guzeldere, G. (eds.) (1997): The Nature of Consciousness: PhilosophicalDebates, Cambridge MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books].Google Scholar
  49. Rosenthal, D.M. (1993):‘Multiple Drafts and Higher-Order Thoughts’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53, 911–918.Google Scholar
  50. Rosenthal, D.M. (2004): Consciousness and Mind, Oxford UP, forthcoming.Google Scholar
  51. Sartre, J.-P. (1937): La Transcendence de l'ego, Paris: Vrin.Google Scholar
  52. Sartre, J.-P. (1943): L'Être et le néant, Paris: Gallimard.Google Scholar
  53. Schiffer, S. (1982):‘Intention Based Semantics’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23, 119–159.Google Scholar
  54. Searle, J.R. (1983): Intentionality, Cambridge: Cambridge UP.Google Scholar
  55. Searle, J.R. (1990):‘Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion, and Cognitive Science’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13.Google Scholar
  56. Searle, J.R. (1991):‘Consciousness, Unconsciousness, and Intentionality’, Philosophical Issues 1, 45–66.Google Scholar
  57. Searle, J.R. (1992): The Rediscovery of Mind, Cambridge MA: MIT Press/ Bradford Books.Google Scholar
  58. Shoemaker, S. (1994):‘Phenomenal Character’, Noûs 28, 21–38.Google Scholar
  59. Siewert, C.P. (1998): The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton NJ: Princeton UP.Google Scholar
  60. Smith, D.W. (1986):‘The Structure of (Self-)Consciousness’, Topoi 5, 149–156.Google Scholar
  61. Strawson, G. (1994): Mental Reality, Cambridge MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.Google Scholar
  62. Thomasson, A.L. (2000):‘After Brentano: A One-Level Theory of Consciousness’, European Journal of Philosophy 8, 190–209.Google Scholar
  63. Tye, M. (1995): Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge MA: MIT Press/ Bradford Books.Google Scholar
  64. Tye, M. (2000): Consciousness, Color, and Content, Cambridge MA: MIT Press/ Bradford Books.Google Scholar
  65. Zahavi, D. (1998):‘Brentano and Husserl on Self-Awareness’, Êtudes Phénomènologiques 27–28, 127–169.Google Scholar
  66. Zahavi, D. (1999): Self-awareness and Alterity, Evanston IL: Northwestern UP.Google Scholar
  67. Ziff, P. (1967):‘On H.P. Grice's Account of Meaning’, Analysis 28, 1–8.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Uriah Kriegel
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBrown UniversityProvidenceUSA, E-mail

Personalised recommendations