Philosophical Studies

, Volume 116, Issue 2, pp 103–131 | Cite as

Physical Constituents of Qualia

  • István Aranyosi


In this paper I propose a defense of a posteriori materialism.Problems with a posteriori identity materialism are identified,and a materialism based on composition, not identity, is proposed.The main task for such a proposal is to account for the relationbetween physical and phenomenal properties. Composition does notseem to be fit as a relation between properties, but I offer apeculiar way to understand property-composition, based on somerecent ideas in the literature on ontology. Finally, I propose amaterialist model for the mind-body relation that is able to resistthe attack from conceivability arguments.


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© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

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  • István Aranyosi

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