Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp 1–23

Introspection and subliminal perception

  • Thomas Zoëga Ramsøy
  • Morten Overgaard
Article

Abstract

Subliminal perception (SP) is today considered a well-supported theory stating that perception can occur without conscious awareness and have a significant impact on later behaviour and thought. In this article, we first present and discuss different approaches to the study of SP. In doing this, we claim that most approaches are based on a dichotomic measure of awareness. Drawing upon recent advances and discussions in the study of introspection and phenomenological psychology, we argue for both the possibility and necessity of using an elaborated measure of subjective states. In the second part of the article, we present findings where these considerations are implemented in an empirical study. The results and implications are discussed in detail, both with reference to SP, and in relation to the more general problem of using elaborate introspective reports as data in relation to studies of cognition.

blindsight introspection nonconscious perception Riddoch syndrome residual phenomenality 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas Zoëga Ramsøy
    • 1
  • Morten Overgaard
    • 2
  1. 1.Danish Research Centre for Magnetic Resonance, MR Department, Section 340Copenhagen University HospitalHvidovreDenmark
  2. 2.Danish National Research Foundation's Centre for Functionally Integrative NeuroscienceAarhus University Hospital & University of AarhusAarhus CDenmark

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