Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 2, Issue 3, pp 187–203

Consciousness in act and action

  • Keith Hossack


This paper develops an account of consciousness in action. Both consciousness and action are related to knowledge. A voluntary action is defined as a volition, or something intentionally effected by means of such volitions. Volitions are conscious mental acts whose proper function is to make their content true. A mental act is the exercise of a power of mind and a conscious mental act is identical with knowledge of its own phenomenal character. This set of definitions elucidates the relations between consciousness, action and knowledge.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Keith Hossack
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyKing's College LondonLondonUK E-mail

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