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Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics

, Volume 25, Issue 1, pp 51–60 | Cite as

Medical Ethics and Double effect: The Case of Terminal Sedation

  • Joseph Boyle
Article

Abstract

The use of terminal sedation to control theintense discomfort of dying patients appearsboth to be an established practice inpalliative care and to run counter to the moraland legal norm that forbids health careprofessionals from intentionally killingpatients. This raises the worry that therequirements of established palliative care areincompatible with moral and legal opposition toeuthanasia. This paper explains how thedoctrine of double effect can be relied on todistinguish terminal sedation from euthanasia. The doctrine of double effect is rooted inCatholic moral casuistry, but its applicationin law and morality need not depend on theparticular framework in which it was developed. The paper further explains how the moral weightof the distinction between intended harms andmerely foreseen harms in the doctrine of doubleeffect can be justified by appeal to alimitation on the human capacity to pursue good.

double-effect euthanasia intention terminal sedation 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joseph Boyle
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Toronto, St. Michael's CollegeTorontoCanada

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