Continental Philosophy Review

, Volume 37, Issue 1, pp 5–20

Where is the phenomenology of attention that Husserl intended to perform? A transcendental pragmatic-oriented description of attention

  • Natalie Depraz

Abstract

For the most part, attention occurs as a theme adjacent to much more topical and innovatingly operating acts: first, the intentional act, which represents a destitution of the abstract opposition between subject and object and which paves the way for a detailed analysis of our perceptive horizontal subjective life; second, the reductive act, specified in a psycho-phenomenological sense as a reflective conversion of the way I am looking at things; third, the genetic method understood as a genealogy of logic based on our experiential affective pre-discursive world-life. In this respect, here are some of the leading questions of my investigation: What are the differences and the proximities between these methods and attentional activity? Why is the latter not put to the fore as a method? To what extent is this secondary part played by attention linked to the constitution of phenomenology as opposed to psychology (for which attention is a central theme), and what does it mean for the impossibility of phenomenology to freeing itself completely from psychology?

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Natalie Depraz
    • 1
  1. 1.PhilosophyCollege International de Philosophie, University of Sorbonne (Paris IV)France

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