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Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 33, Issue 1, pp 89–123 | Cite as

Three Models of Sequential Belief Updating on Uncertain Evidence

  • James Hawthorne
Article

Abstract

Jeffrey updating is a natural extension of Bayesian updating to cases where the evidence is uncertain. But, the resulting degrees of belief appear to be sensitive to the order in which the uncertain evidence is acquired, a rather un-Bayesian looking effect. This order dependence results from the way in which basic Jeffrey updating is usually extended to sequences of updates. The usual extension seems very natural, but there are other plausible ways to extend Bayesian updating that maintain order-independence. I will explore three models of sequential updating, the usual extension and two alternatives. I will show that the alternative updating schemes derive from extensions of the usual rigidity requirement, which is at the heart of Jeffrey updating. Finally, I will establish necessary and sufficient conditions for order-independent updating, and show that extended rigidity is closely related to these conditions.

Bayesian updating Jeffrey conditionalization probability kinematics probabilistic logic uncertain evidence 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • James Hawthorne
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of OklahomaNormanU.S.A

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