Linguistics and Philosophy

, Volume 27, Issue 4, pp 493–527

Signalling Games Select Horn Strategies

  • Robert van Rooy

DOI: 10.1023/B:LING.0000024403.88733.3f

Cite this article as:
van Rooy, R. Linguistics and Philosophy (2004) 27: 493. doi:10.1023/B:LING.0000024403.88733.3f


In this paper I will discuss why (un) marked expressionstypically get an (un)marked interpretation: Horn'sdivision of pragmatic labor. It is argued that it is aconventional fact that we use language this way.This convention will be explained in terms ofthe equilibria of signalling games introduced byLewis (1969), but now in an evolutionary setting. Iwill also relate this signalling game analysis withParikh's (1991, 2000, 2001) game-theoretical analysis ofsuccessful communication, which in turn is compared withBlutner's: 2000) bi-directional optimality theory.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert van Rooy
    • 1
  1. 1.ILLC Department of PhilosophyUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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