Foundations of Chemistry

, Volume 7, Issue 1, pp 57–84

On the inventors of XYZ

  • J. van Brakel
Article

Abstract

In this paper I try to make as much sense aspossible of, first, the extensive philosophicalliterature concerned with the status of `Wateris H2O' and, second, the implications ofPutnam's invention of Twin Earth, anotherpossible world stipulated to be just like Earth, except that water is XYZ, notH2O.

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© Springer 2005

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  • J. van Brakel

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