Electronic Commerce Research

, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 25–49 | Cite as

Probabilistic Automated Bidding in Multiple Auctions

  • Marlon Dumas
  • Lachlan Aldred
  • Guido Governatori
  • Arthur H.M. ter Hofstede

Abstract

This paper presents an approach to develop bidding agents that participate in multiple auctions with the goal of obtaining an item with a given probability. The approach consists of a prediction method and a planning algorithm. The prediction method exploits the history of past auctions to compute probability functions capturing the belief that a bid of a given price may win a given auction. The planning algorithm computes a price and a set of compatible auctions, such that by sequentially bidding this price in each of the auctions, the agent can obtain the item with the desired probability. Experiments show that the approach increases the payoff of their users and the welfare of the market.

online auctions bidding agents bidding strategy 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marlon Dumas
    • 1
  • Lachlan Aldred
    • 1
  • Guido Governatori
    • 2
  • Arthur H.M. ter Hofstede
    • 1
  1. 1.Centre for IT InnovationQueensland University of TechnologyBrisbaneAustralia
  2. 2.School of ITEEThe University of QueenslandBrisbaneAustralia

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