Designs, Codes and Cryptography

, Volume 33, Issue 3, pp 261–274

Security of Signature Schemes in a Multi-User Setting

  • Alfred Menezes
  • Nigel Smart
Article

Abstract

This paper initiates the study of the security of signature schemes in the multi-user setting. We argue that the well-accepted notion of security for signature schemes, namely existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks, is not adequate for the multi-user setting. We propose an extension of this security notion to the multi-user setting and show that signature schemes proven secure in the single-user setting can, under reasonable constraints, also be proven secure in the multi-user setting.

digital signatures provable security 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alfred Menezes
  • Nigel Smart

There are no affiliations available

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