Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 15, Issue 2, pp 133–144 | Cite as

The Status of the Status Quo

  • James M. Buchanan


The status quo plays a central role in both the positive and normative analysis associated with the constitutionalist and contractarian perspective. This paper reviews the status of the status quo in this context by identifying and addressing a series of questions relating to the definition, emergence and value of the status quo.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • James M. Buchanan
    • 1
  1. 1.George Mason UniversityUSA

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