# Extending Answer Sets for Logic Programming Agents

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## Abstract

We present systems of logic programming agents (LPAS) to model the interactions between decision-makers while evolving to a conclusion. Such a system consists of a number of agents connected by means of unidirectional communication channels. Agents communicate with each other by passing answer sets obtained by updating the information received from connected agents with their own private information. We introduce a credulous answer set semantics for logic programming agents. As an application, we show how extensive games with perfect information can be conveniently represented as logic programming agent systems, where each agent embodies the reasoning of a game player, such that the equilibria of the game correspond with the semantics agreed upon by the agents in the LPAS.

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