Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 11, Issue 4, pp 353–369 | Cite as

Implementing Generality while Reducing the Risk for Fiscal Explosion

  • Niclas Berggren

Abstract

The generality principle, advocatedby Buchanan and Congleton (1998), requires that political decisionstreat all citizens equally qua citizens. The effects of implementingsuch a constitutional rule on lobbying, public expenditures,economic efficiency, and disposable incomes are explored. Themain contribution is to propose a way of mitigating potentiallynegative effects not discussed by Buchanan and Congleton, especiallythe risk for “fiscal explosion.” It is suggested that if generalityis augmented with a rule stating that public expenditures asa share of GDP are not to rise, this will probably render generalitymore attractive than non-generality for most citizens.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Niclas Berggren
    • 1
  1. 1.City University of StockholmStockholmSweden

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