This article begins with an introduction to defeasible (nonmonotonic) reasoning and a brief description of a computer program, EVID, which can perform such reasoning. I then explain, and illustrate with examples, how this program can be applied in computational representations of ordinary dialogic argumentation. The program represents the beliefs and doubts of the dialoguers, and uses these propositional attitudes, which can include commonsense defeasible inference rules, to infer various changing conclusions as a dialogue progresses. It is proposed that computational representations of this kind are a useful tool in the analysis of dialogic argumentation, and, in particular, demonstrate the important role of defeasible reasoning in everyday arguments using commonsense reasoning.
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Causey, R. L.: 1987, ‘Simulations and Experiments in Philosophy of Science’, Perspectives in Computing 7, IBM, Armonk, NY, 23–33.Google Scholar
- Chisholm, R. M.: 1964, ‘The Ethics of Requirement’, American Philosophical Quarterly 1, 147–153Google Scholar
- Eemeren, F. H. van et al.: 1996, Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory, Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ.Google Scholar
- Ginsberg, M. L. (ed.): 1987, Readings in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, California.Google Scholar
- Ross, W. D.: 1930: The Right and the Good, Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
- Snoeck Henkemans, A. F.: 1994, ‘Complex Argumentation in a Critical Discussion’, in F. H. van Eemeren and R. Grootendorst (eds.), Studies in Pragma-Dialectics 4, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 69–78. [Note: The three arguments discussed in the present article are also stated in Snoeck Henkemans, ‘A Dialogical Approach to Complex Argumentation’, in this issue of Argumentation. However, all references to her work that are in the present article are references to the 1994 publication.]Google Scholar
- Sterling, L. and E. Shapiro: 1994, The Art of Prolog, 2nd ed., MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
- Tillers, P. and E. D. Green (eds.): 1988, Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence: The Uses and Limits of Bayesianism Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 109), Kluwer, Dordrecht.Google Scholar
- Tribe, L. H.: 1971, ‘Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process’, Harvard Law Review 84, 1329–1393.Google Scholar