, Volume 59, Issue 3, pp 311–347 | Cite as

Learning to Take Turns

  • Peter Vanderschraaf
  • Brian Skyrms


Learning to take turns in repeated game situations is a robust phenomenon in both laboratory experiments and in everyday life. Nevertheless, it has received little attention in recent studies of learning dynamics in games. We investigate the simplest and most obvious extension of fictitious play to a learning rule that can recognize patterns, and show how players using this rule can spontaneously learn to take turns.


Laboratory Experiment Everyday Life Learning Rule Repeated Game Obvious Extension 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Vanderschraaf
    • 1
  • Brian Skyrms
    • 2
  1. 1.Departments of Philosophy and Social and Decision SciencesCarnegie Mellon UniversityPittsburghU.S.A
  2. 2.Logic and Philosophy of ScienceUniversity of California at IrvineIrvineU.S.A

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