Experimental Economics

, Volume 6, Issue 2, pp 181–207 | Cite as

Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games

  • David J. Cooper
  • Nick Feltovich
  • Alvin E. Roth
  • Rami Zwick


Learning models predict that the relative speed at which players in a game adjust their behavior has a critical influence on long term behavior. In an ultimatum game, the prediction is that proposers learn not to make small offers faster than responders learn not to reject them. We experimentally test whether relative speed of learning has the predicted effect, by manipulating the amount of experience accumulated by proposers and responders. The experiment allows the predicted learning by responders to be observed, for the first time.

Game Theory learning bargaining 


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • David J. Cooper
    • 1
  • Nick Feltovich
    • 2
  • Alvin E. Roth
    • 3
  • Rami Zwick
    • 4
  1. 1.Case Western Reserve UniversityUSA
  2. 2.University of HoustonUSA
  3. 3.Harvard UniversityUSA
  4. 4.Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyHong Kong

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