, Volume 17, Issue 3, pp 291–313

Logical Argument Structures in Decision-making

  • Jane Macoubrie

DOI: 10.1023/A:1025117226851

Cite this article as:
Macoubrie, J. Argumentation (2003) 17: 291. doi:10.1023/A:1025117226851


Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's practical reasoning theory has attracted a great deal of interest since its publication in 1969. Their most important assertion, however, that argument is the logical basis for practical decision-making, has been under-utilized, primarily because it was not sufficiently operationalized for research purposes. This essay presents an operationalization of practical reasoning for use in analyzing argument logics that emerge through group interaction. Particular elements of discourse and argument are identified as responding to principles put forward by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and are viewed as fitting together in a kind of logical argument structure that is well suited to the study of practical arguments in decision-making. Both the content elements and the logical argument structure are illustrated using examples from two studies examining decision logics in public participation and jury decision-making. Advantages of this approach and proposed recognition of a new `filtered' type of argument structure are discussed.

argumentative case argument content filtered argument logic structures Perelman 

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jane Macoubrie
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of CommunicationNorth Carolina State UniversityRaleighU.S.A.

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