Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

, Volume 6, Issue 2, pp 231–235 | Cite as

Discussion – Ryberg's Doubts about Higher and Lower Pleasures – Put to Rest?

  • Wlodek Rabinowicz

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REFERENCES

  1. Arrhenius, G., and Rabinowicz, W., 2003, Millian Discontinuities, draft.Google Scholar
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  6. Parfit, D., Overpopulation and the Quality of Life, in Peter Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 145–164.Google Scholar
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© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wlodek Rabinowicz

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