Public Choice

, Volume 116, Issue 1–2, pp 165–184 | Cite as

Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity

  • Dominique Lepelley
  • Fabrice Valognes

Abstract

To what extent are some voting rules more vulnerable tostrategic manipulation than others? In order to answer thisquestion, representations are developed for the coalitionalmanipulability of eight voting rules under various assumptionsconcerning the likelihood that given voters' preferenceprofiles are observed on three alternatives. Of particularinterest is the impact that social homogeneity (defined as thetendency of voters' preference to be similar) has on themanipulability of voting rules. The results we obtain showthat the hierarchy of the voting rules that results from ourcomputations can crucially depend on the degree of socialhomogeneity. However, it turns out that, whatever the degreeof homogeneity, the Hare method (or two-stage plurality)minimizes susceptibility to strategic manipulation bycoalitions of voters in three-candidate elections.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dominique Lepelley
    • 1
  • Fabrice Valognes
    • 2
  1. 1.GEMMA, University of CaenCaen, CedexFrance
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsLe Havre UniversityLe HavreFrance

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