Studia Logica

, Volume 73, Issue 2, pp 219–240 | Cite as

Belief Revision, Rational Choice and the Unity of Reason

  • Erik J. Olsson


Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are not forthcoming.

belief revision rational choice reason practical theoretical unity AGM 


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Erik J. Olsson
    • 1
  1. 1.Fachbereich PhilosophieUniversität KonstanzKonstanzGermany

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