Synthese

, Volume 135, Issue 1, pp 77–118 | Cite as

Propositional Attitudes Without Propositions

  • Friederike Moltmann
Article

Abstract

The most common account of attitude reports is the relational analysis according towhich an attitude verb taking that-clause complements expresses a two-placerelation between agents and propositions and the that-clause acts as an expressionwhose function is to provide the propositional argument. I will argue that a closerexamination of a broader range of linguistic facts raises serious problems for thisanalysis and instead favours a Russellian `multiple relations analysis' (which hasgenerally been discarded because of its apparent obvious linguistic implausibility).The resulting account can be given independent philosophical motivations within anintentionalist view of truth and predication.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Friederike Moltmann
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of StirlingStirlingUK E-mail

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