Studia Logica

, Volume 73, Issue 2, pp 241–256 | Cite as

Remarks on the Absentminded Driver

  • Wlodek Rabinowicz
Article

Abstract

Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) present and analyse the sequential decision problem of an “absentminded driver”. The driver's absentmindedness (imperfect recall) leads him to time-inconsistent strategy evaluations. His original evaluation gets replaced by a new one under impact of the information that the circumstances have changed, notwithstanding the fact that this change in circumstances has been expected by him all along. The time inconsistency in strategy evaluation suggests that such an agent might have reason to renege on his adopted strategy. As we shall see, however, this danger is only apparent. There is no serious problem of dynamic inconsistency in this case. My diagnosis of the case under consideration is in many respects similar to the one provided by Aumann, Hart and Perry (1997), but the analysis leading to this diagnosis is not quite the same.

sequential choice dynamic decision-making imperfect recall time-inconsistency strategy choice expected-utility maximization dynamic inconsistency imperfect recall strategies conditional expected utility 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wlodek Rabinowicz
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyLund UniversitySweden

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