Philosophical Studies

, Volume 112, Issue 1, pp 93–102 | Cite as

The Metaphysics of Velocity

  • Ulrich Meyer
Article

Abstract

Some authors have recently arguedthat an object’s velocity is logicallyindependent of its locations throughout time.Their aim is to deny the Russellianview that motion is merely a change oflocation, and to promote a rival account onwhich the connection between velocities andtrajectories is provided by the laws ofnature. I defend the Russellian view of motionagainst these attacks.

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REFERENCES

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ulrich Meyer
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyDavidson CollegeDavidsonUSA E-mail

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