Philosophical Studies

, Volume 112, Issue 2, pp 135–145

Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency

  • Richard Feldman
  • Andrei A. Buckareff
Article

Abstract

We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanationsof free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offersare neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns toreasons in the etiology of actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Richard Feldman
    • 1
  • Andrei A. Buckareff
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of RochesterRochesterUSA E-mails

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