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Studia Logica

, Volume 72, Issue 3, pp 339–362 | Cite as

Obligation and the Conditional in Stit Theory

  • Kevin Davey
Article
  • 66 Downloads

Abstract

In this paper, we consider two different ways in which modus-ponens type reasoning with conditional obligations may be formalized. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for the validity of each, and make some philosophical observations about the differences between the minor premises that each formalization requires. All this is done within the context of the Belnap-Perloff stit theory.

obligation conditional obligation stit theory 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kevin Davey
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of PittsburghPittsburghUSA

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