Theory and Decision

, Volume 53, Issue 1, pp 1–28

A Non-cooperative Axiomatization of the Core

  • Akira Okada
  • Eyal Winter
Article

Abstract

We treat a class of multi-person bargaining mechanisms based on games in coalitional form. For this class of games we identify properties of non-cooperative solution concepts, which are necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium outcomes to coincide with the core of the underlying coalitional form game. We view this result as a non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. In contrast to most of the literature on multi-person bargaining we avoid a precise specification of the rules of the game. Alternatively, we impose properties of such games, which give rise to a large class of mechanisms, all of which are relevant for our axiomatization.

Multilateral bargaining Core Non-cooperative axiomatization Game equilibrium 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Akira Okada
    • 1
  • Eyal Winter
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Institute of Economic ResearchKyoto UniversitySakyo, KyotoJAPAN
  2. 2.Department of Economics European UniversityInstitute Badia FiesolanaSan Domenico di Fiesole (FI)Italy
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsThe Hebrew UniversityJerusalemIsrael

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