Philosophical Studies

, Volume 110, Issue 3, pp 249–266 | Cite as

The Diagonal and the Demon

  • Juan Comesaña
Article

Abstract

Reliabilism about epistemic justification – thethesis that what makes a belief epistemicallyjustified is that it was produced by a reliableprocess of belief-formation – must face twoproblems. First, what has been called ``the newevil demon problem'', which arises from the ideathat the beliefs of victims of an evil demonare as justified as our own beliefs, althoughthey are not – the objector claims – reliablyproduced. And second, the problem of diagnosingwhy skepticism is so appealing despite beingfalse. I present a special version ofreliabilism, ``indexical reliabilism'', based ontwo-dimensional semantics, and show how it cansolve both problems.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Juan Comesaña
    • 1
  1. 1.Brown UniversityProvidence

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