Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 1, Issue 2, pp 181–224

Science as if situation mattered

  • Michel Bitbol
Article

Abstract

When he formulated the program of neurophenomenology, Francisco Varela suggested a balanced methodological dissolution of the “hard problem” of consciousness. I show that his dissolution is a paradigm which imposes itself onto seemingly opposite views, including materialist approaches. I also point out that Varela's revolutionary epistemological ideas are gaining wider acceptance as a side effect of a recent controversy between hermeneutists and eliminativists. Finally, I emphasize a structural parallel between the science of consciousness and the distinctive features of quantum mechanics. This parallel, together with the former convergences, point towards the common origin of the main puzzles of both quantum mechanics and the philosophy of mind: neglect of the constitutive blindspot of objective knowledge.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michel Bitbol
    • 1
  1. 1.CREA/CNRS, 1, rue DescartesParisFrance

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