Theory and Decision

, Volume 52, Issue 3, pp 267–286 | Cite as

Committee Decisions with Partisans and Side-Transfers

  • Mehmet Bac
  • Parimal Kanti Bag
Article

Abstract

A dichotomous decision-making context in committees is considered where potential partisan members with predetermined votes can generate inefficient decisions and buy neutral votes. The optimal voting rule minimizing the expected costs of inefficient decisions for the case of a three-member committee is analyzed. It is shown that the optimal voting rule can be non-monotonic with respect to side-transfers: in the symmetric case, majority voting is optimal under either zero, mild or full side-transfer possibilities, whereas unanimity voting may be optimal under an intermediate side-transfer possibility. The side-transfer possibilities depend on the power of partisans (their ability or willingness to pay for neutral votes) relative to the corruptibility of neutral members (personal cost of deliberately casting a `wrong' vote).

Committee Partisan voting Vote buying Majority rule Unanimity rule 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

REFERENCES

  1. Ben-Yashar, R. and Nitzan, S. (1997), The optimal decision rule for fixed-size committees in dichotomous choice situations: The general result, International Economic Review 38: 175–186.Google Scholar
  2. Buchanan, J.M. and Lee, D.R. (1986), Vote buying in a stylized setting, Public Choice 49: 3–15.Google Scholar
  3. Condorcet, N.C. de. (1785), Essai sur l'Application de l'Analyse à la Probabilité des Décisions Rendues à la Pluralité des Voix.Paris.Google Scholar
  4. Gradstein, M. and Nitzan, S. (1988), Participation, decision aggregation and internal information gathering in organizational decision making, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 10: 415–431.Google Scholar
  5. Gradstein, M., Nitzan, S. and Paroush, J. (1990), Collective decision making and the limits on the organization size, Public Choice 66: 279–291.Google Scholar
  6. Kochin, M.S. and Kochin, L.A. (1998), When is vote buying wrong? Public Choice 97: 645–662.Google Scholar
  7. McLean, I. and Hewitt, F. (1994), Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and Political Theory. Brookfield, VT: Elgar.Google Scholar
  8. Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1988), An economic approach to influence activities in organizations, American Journal of Sociology 94 (Supplement): 154–179.Google Scholar
  9. Nitzan, S. and Paroush, J. (1982), Optimal decision rules in uncertain dichotomous choice situation, International Economic Review 23: 289–297.Google Scholar
  10. Nitzan, S. and Paroush, J. (1984), A general theorem and eight corollaries in search of a correct decision, Theory and Decision 17: 211–220.Google Scholar
  11. Nitzan, S. and Procaccia, U. (1986), Optimal voting procedures for profit maximizing firms, Public Choice 51: 191–208.Google Scholar
  12. Sah, R. and Stiglitz, J. (1988), Committees, hierarchies and polyarchies, Economic Journal 98: 451–470.Google Scholar
  13. Shapley, L. and Grofman, B. (1984), Optimizing Group Judgmental Accuracy in the Presence of Interdependence, Public Choice 43: 329–343.Google Scholar
  14. Tullock, G. (1998), On Voting. Edward Elgar: Northampton, MA.Google Scholar
  15. Weiss, J.H. (1988), Is Vote Selling Desirable? Public Choice 59: 177–194.Google Scholar
  16. Young, H.P. (1988), Condorcet's rule, American Political Science Review 82: 1231–1244.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mehmet Bac
    • 1
  • Parimal Kanti Bag
    • 2
  1. 1.Faculty of Arts and SciencesSabanci UniversityIstanbulTurkey
  2. 2.Department of Economics and Finance, Birkbeck CollegeUniversity of LondonLondonU.K.

Personalised recommendations