What Do We Conclude from the Success and Failure of Mergers?
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Tichy's review of the evidence presents at best a very mixed picture of the “success” of mergers as a corporate strategy. However, care should be taken not to interpret this as a case for crudely prohibitive competition policy. A simple framework is developed to show that mergers anticipating market changes might not be inappropriate, even when ex post results will appear disappointing. We argue that the competition authorities should protect consumers, and not provide management consultancy on behalf of shareholders. We suggest a more limited reform of the EC Merger Regulation than that proposed by Tichy.
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