Annals of Operations Research

, Volume 89, Issue 0, pp 233–251 | Cite as

The spatially dominant equilibrium of a game

  • J. Hofbauer
Article

Abstract

A new framework for equilibrium selection is presented. Playing games recurrently inspace and time may render one of the equilibria “spatially dominant”. Prevailing initially ona large enough finite part of the space, it will take over on the whole space in the long run.In particular it will drive out the other equilibria along travelling waves. This new dominanceconcept is compared with the Harsanyi‐Selten risk‐dominance concept.

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© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

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  • J. Hofbauer

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