Beliefs, time and incomplete information in multiple encounter negotiations among autonomous agents

  • Sarit Kraus


In negotiations among autonomous agents over resource allocation, beliefs about opponents, and about opponents’ beliefs, become particularly important when there is incomplete information. This paper considers interactions among self‐motivated, rational, and autonomous agents, each with its own utility function, and each seeking to maximize its expected utility. The paper expands upon previous work and focuses on incomplete information and multiple encounters among the agents. It presents a strategic model that takes into consideration the passage of time during the negotiation and also includes belief systems. The paper provides strategies for a wide range of situations. The framework satisfies the following criteria: symmetrical distribution, simplicity, instantaneously, efficiency and stability.


Incomplete Information Expected Utility Mixed Strategy Pure Strategy Belief Revision 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sarit Kraus
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Mathematics and Computer ScienceBar Ilan UniversityRamat GanIsrael
  2. 2.Institute for Advanced Computer StudiesUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkUSA

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