Public Choice

, Volume 93, Issue 3–4, pp 373–388 | Cite as

A comparison of rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict

  • Hugh M. Neary


This paper provides a comparative analysis of the basic rent-seeking model and a simple economic model of conflict. Each model is concerned with a game in which players invest resources in pursuit of a prize. The purpose of the analysis is to elucidate structural differences between the two models, and to analyse the consequent behavioral differences and equilibrium outcomes in the two cases. A key finding is that, where such comparisons are possible, the conflict model tends to involve greater relative expenditure on wealth-redistribution activities than does the rent-seeking model.


Marginal Cost Public Choice American Economic Review Consumption Expenditure Success Function 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hugh M. Neary
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of British ColumbiaVancouverCanada

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