Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 30, Issue 4, pp 329–354 | Cite as

Truth Via Anaphorically Unrestricted Quantifiers

  • Jody Azzouni


A new approach to truth is offered which dispenses with the truth predicate, and replaces it with a special kind of quantifier which simultaneously binds variables in sentential and nominal positions. The resulting theory of truth for a (first-order) language is shown to be able to handle blind truth ascriptions, and is shown to be compatible with a characterization of the semantic and syntactic principles governing that language. Comparisons with other approaches to truth are drawn. An axiomatization of AU-quantifiers and a model theory for them is given, and an appendix contains a completeness proof.

truth Alfred Tarski Deflationism blind ascriptions anaphora semantic rules axioms completeness 


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jody Azzouni
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy Tufts UniversityU.S.A

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