European Journal of Law and Economics

, Volume 14, Issue 2, pp 129–150 | Cite as

Market Transparency and Collusion: On the UK Agricultural Tractor Registration Exchange

  • Nikolaos Georgantzís
  • Gerardo Sabater-Grande


We review the decision by the European Commission in the case of the UK Agricultural Registration Exchange. We propose a theoretical model, offering a basis for some of the intuitive arguments used by the Commission on the anti-competitive role of information exchange in the case of price and non price collusion. Market transparency on non price data is shown to be a collusion facilitating device which may achieve stability in otherwise unstable cartels.

anticompetitive practices promotional effort market transparency price collusion 


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nikolaos Georgantzís
    • 1
  • Gerardo Sabater-Grande
    • 1
  1. 1.University Jaume ICastellónSpain

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