Health Care Analysis

, Volume 10, Issue 2, pp 165–175 | Cite as

Intentional Parenthood: Responsibilities in Surrogate Motherhood

  • Liezl van Zyl


In recent years, a number of writers dealingwith questions over parenthood that arisein the context of reproductive technologies andsurrogate motherhood, have appealed to thenotion of ``intentional parenthood''. Basingtheir argument on liberal values such asindividual autonomy, the freedom to entercontracts, the right to privacy, and individualself-fulfilment, they argue that contractuallystated intentions, rather than genetic orgestational relationships, should form thebasis of parental rights. Against this I arguethat parental rights do not derive fromcontractual agreements, but are based in theirobligations towards the child. I then examinethe nature of the obligations that the variousparties have towards the child both pre- andpostnatally.

children's rights intentional parenthood liberal individualism parental rights and responsibilities surrogate motherhood 


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Liezl van Zyl
    • 1
  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentUniversity of WaikatoHamiltonNew Zealand

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