Philosophical Studies

, Volume 108, Issue 1–2, pp 213–222 | Cite as

Yes, Virginia, Lemons are Yellow

  • Alex Byrne
Article

Abstract

This paper discusses a number of themes and arguments in The Quest for Reality: Stroud's distinction between “philosophical” and “ordinary” questions about reality; the similarity he finds between the view that coloris “unreal” and the view that it is “subjective”; his argument against thesecondary quality theory; his argument against the error theory; and the “disappointing” conclusion of the book.

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REFERENCES

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alex Byrne
    • 1
  1. 1.Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA

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