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First-person thoughts and embodied self-awareness: Some reflections on the relation between recent analytical philosophy and phenomenology

  • Dan Zahavi
Article

Abstract

The article examines some of the main theses about self-awareness developed in recent analytic philosophy of mind (especially the work of Bermúdez), and points to a number of striking overlaps between these accounts and the ones to be found in phenomenology. Given the real risk of unintended repetitions, it is argued that it would be counterproductive for philosophy of mind to ignore already existing resources, and that both analytical philosophy and phenomenology would profit from a more open exchange.

Keywords

Artificial Intelligence Open Exchange Analytical Philosophy Real Risk 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dan Zahavi
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Educational PhilosophyDanish University of EducationDenmark

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