Theory and Decision

, Volume 52, Issue 2, pp 139–147

Why the Infinite Decision Puzzle is Puzzling

  • Jeffrey A. Barrett
  • Frank Arntzenius
Article

Abstract

Pulier (2000, Theory and Decision 49: 291) and Machina (2000, Theory and Decision 49: 293) seek to dissolve the Barrett–Arntzenius infinite decision puzzle (1999, Theory and Decision 46: 101). The proposed dissolutions, however, are based on misunderstandings concerning how the puzzle works and the nature of supertasks more generally. We will describe the puzzle in a simplified form, address the recent misunderstandings, and describe possible morals for decision theory.

Dutch book Supertask Puzzle 

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References

  1. Barrett J. A. and tzenius, F. (1999), An ifinite decision puzzle, Theory and Decision 46(3): 101–103.Google Scholar
  2. Earman, J. and Norton, J.D. (1996), Infinite pains: The trouble with supertasks, in A. Morton and S. Stich (eds.), Benacerraf and His Critics, pp. 231–261. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  3. Laraudogoitia, J.P. (2000), Spacetime: Supertasks, in E.N. Zalta (ed.), Stan-ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-supertasks Google Scholar
  4. Machina, M. J. (2000), Barrett and Arntzenius's, infinite decision puzzle, Theory and Decision 49(3): 293–297.Google Scholar
  5. Pulier, M. L. (2000), A flawed infinite decision puzzle, Theory and Decision 49(3): 291–292.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jeffrey A. Barrett
    • 1
  • Frank Arntzenius
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Logic and Philosophy of ScienceUniversity of California-IrvineIrvineUSA

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